1	COURT OF APPEALS			
2	STATE OF NEW YORK			
3	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,			
4	Respondent,			
5	-against-			
6	NO. 100 ROSS CAMPBELL,			
7	Appellant.			
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York			
10	September 12, 2017 Before:			
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE			
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN			
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA			
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN			
15				
16	Appearances:			
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25	Penina Wolick: Official Court Transcribe:			



1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next matter on the 2 calendar is number 100, the People of the State of New York 3 v. Ross Campbell. 4 MS. EVERETT: May it please the court, my name is 5 Abigail Everett. I'd like to reserve two minutes for 6 rebuttal, please. 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, Ms. Everett. 8 MS. EVERETT: On this record, defense counsel's 9 errors are manifest, as is the prejudice to Mr. Campbell. 10 JUDGE GARCIA: On that point, counsel, why isn't this a 440? 11 MS. EVERETT: Because the record is clear that -12 13 - - that we've met the Strickland standards. 14 JUDGE GARCIA: Let's - - - let's go to the juror 15 16

issue; all right? We're not at jury selection. We're not defense counsel. They're watching this juror. It's a cold record we're reading. But there clearly seems to be an issue with this juror's desire to serve.

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And wouldn't it be perfectly plausible for a defense lawyer to conclude that whatever excuse that she is giving - - - and some of them are quite serious, but the story seems to change - - - whatever that is, I want a person like that on my jury? I want someone who doesn't want to be here. I want somebody who wants out. Because maybe they're going to turn this thing a little bit upside

down, and maybe they'll be annoyed with the prosecutor for putting on a long case. Why don't we have a record of what exactly the defense lawyer was thinking when they didn't strike this juror?

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And we're reading a cold record, which again, on its face, could be read arguably to say I'm a defense lawyer, I want a juror who may be a problem on this jury.

MS. EVERETT: Because this record makes it clear that the defense lawyer, as was the judge and the DA, were confused. This is a case where the record that you have explicitly contradicts the notion that there was strategy at play. This was not strategy, it was confusion.

JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, you know, the defense lawyer successfully turns the judge and the prosecutor around on two for-cause challenges in that very group of - - I think it's eighteen or nineteen jurors at that point that are left in the venire. And while he does highlight to the judge the - - - the financial hardship aspect of the juror's complaints, overlooks the - - her past sexual assault.

Why can't he just be keeping that, as Judge

Garcia says, in his back pocket? So I mean, this is not a

- - - a defense lawyer who is incapable of - - - of saying

Judge, you're wrong. He clearly does it. It's right there
in the record.

MS. EVERETT: Right. But the problem is, unlike this court's decision in Barboni where the court noticed that there was some confusion but said it was fleeting, the confusion here is manifest. And there are other instances in the record where you can see that the parties are confused.

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I cited in the brief another juror, where the defense lawyer said I thought this person wanted to come in and speak, and then he was corrected, and it turns out he said something about well, my notes must be confused. So this is not an isolated incident in this voir dire that this person was confused.

JUDGE GARCIA: But if the record's confused, isn't that even more of a reason to have a 440 where this counsel can come in and say here's what the record was in my opinion, and here's why I did this? And that may be a valid reason or it may not be a valid reason.

MS. EVERETT: But Your Honor, the record isn't confused. It was the lawyer who was confused. The record is clear when the judge says to him isn't this the person who said she had a financial interest - - - that she was worried about losing her job; the defense lawyer said that's the one. Nobody focused on the fact that this woman - - let's - - - let's be - - - think about this from the juror's point of view for a second. This is a woman who

said she'd been twice the victim of sexual assaults. She said she did not want to serve on this sex crime jury, and she said she wanted to speak in private to the judge. The record couldn't be clearer that the judge did not bring her in.

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JUDGE RIVERA: But she also - - - she also said her husband's being prosecuted, and so she might have - - - the defense counsel could have - - - this is not a measure of whether or not that was the right call or the wrong call - - could have looked at this and thought she'll put the blame on this prosecutor before she puts the blame on my client.

MS. EVERETT: In isolation, I see that point, but the record just doesn't suggest that, because we have such a clear indication that the People are confused, and - - - and the other thing about this - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Maybe they didn't want the juror off, so it's better to be confused, because if you raise that challenge, maybe the judge will say, yeah, you know what? You're right. I'm going to get rid of this juror. And for other reasons, they didn't want to get rid of the juror.

MS. EVERETT: But the --- the --- not only did the defense lawyer not seem to understand what was going on, but he failed to educate --- to enlighten the

poor judge who was - - - has to exercise his discretion
about this woman who's asking to be let off. She's saying
that it will be very difficult for her to serve because of
her experience as a victim. And the - - - the judge is
asking, is this the person with the financial concerns. So
that - - - you know, it's hard to believe that somebody for
strategic reasons would mislead the judge that way.

JUDGE FEINMAN: I don't know if she actually
comes out and says I can't serve because of my prior
similar incident. And - - - and while it may have been
better to explore that in the - - - you know, in camera

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with her, I don't know how you - - I think you make the statement in your brief that there was a substantial risk that her prior sexual assault was going to affect her thinking. And I don't know where you - - -

MS. EVERETT: I - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - get a basis for that.

MS. EVERETT: - - - I think that under 270, if you're looking for what - - - a cause challenge, let's - - a woman who comes in and says I've twice been a victim of rape, this is a rape trial, I don't want to sit on this case, it would be difficult for me - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, she - - -

MS. EVERETT: - - - I think it's - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - she never said - - - she



1	never uses those words.	
2	MS. EVERETT: She	
3	JUDGE FEINMAN: I don't want sit on the on	
4	this case.	
5	MS. EVERETT: She said she didn't want to serve.	
6	And he asked her the defense lawyer asked her if -	
7	_	
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Related to the question of the	
9	prior sexual assault, or related to the fact that	
10	MS. EVERETT: No, just in general	
11	JUDGE RIVERA: silence.	
12	MS. EVERETT: she said she didn't want to	
13	serve. But initially she said	
14	JUDGE RIVERA: She raises this question of the	
15	sexual assaults later, right?	
16	MS. EVERETT: Later in the proceeding when the -	
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18	JUDGE RIVERA: When she's saying, oh, the	
19	memory's coming back.	
20	MS. EVERETT: defense lawyer is questioning	
21	and the	
22	JUDGE RIVERA: All right.	
23	MS. EVERETT: defense lawyer says to her,	
24	well, would it be difficult for you to serve on this in	
25	relation to the sexual assault history? And she said yes,	

it would be difficult.

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JUDGE STEIN: Haven't we drawn a line, maybe not an absolute line, but you know, as I see it, cases where there - - there absolutely can never be a - - - a reasonable strategy. And those are cases like doesn't argue a statute of limitations.

Here we are, seven judges and yourself, and - - and we haven't talked to your adversary yet, and we're all postulating what the strategy might have been.

And while you may not agree that they - - - that there was a good strategy or that even there was any strategy, we don't know. And isn't that what the purpose of a 440 motion is?

MS. EVERETT: Is it relevant that she shouldn't have been forced to serve on this jury given her history and the statement that she said that it was difficult?

TUDGE FAHEY: No, but that - - - that - - that's - - - I don't think that's the point. I think the
point is you have two prongs in ineffective assistance of
counsel. One is the multiple error prong. And - - - and
this case may have a number of multiple errors. And then
there's the Turner dispositive error. You know, one's
Baldi, one's Turner dispositive error.

And - - - and the way I understood what - - - what Judge Stein was saying is we can't point to the



dispositive error here, the error that would have changed the case. So what we have to do is evaluate each multiple error; and then it's hard to do that without the 440.

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MS. EVERETT: As long as we're talking about isolated multiple errors, I do want to get to the fact that we also have the lawyer's failure to object to testimony from an absent victim. The police officer who testified that the woman who didn't come in to testify said at the grand jury that she identified Mr. Campbell, and also that he said specifically that she said about the co-defendant, that's the guy who told the fat kid to rape me.

Now, the - - - below in the Appellate Division,

the - - - the court agreed - - - they said it was

unpreserved, but they agreed that this testimony shouldn't

have come in, but they talked about it being harmless

error. Now, I think that - - - I see my time is up and

maybe I'll - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Complete your thought.

I'll let you complete - - -

MS. EVERETT: I think we've got a case where they

--- you know, the defendant testified, he's got a job,

he's never been arrested, he's been in the army. He said I

was in the apartment, but I didn't participate. The issue

is not identification in the sense of did he participate,

but was she correct in saying that he committed criminal

acts in the apartment. Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.

Counsel?

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MR. SINGH: May it please the court, Ramandeep Singh for the People of Bronx County.

Your Honors, I think this case presents a great opportunity for this court to reaffirm the principle that claims based on matters off the record must be developed by way of a 440 motion.

Strategy in the sexual assault case when one of the prospective jurors says I've been a victim twice of rape, and in - - in that colloquy with the prosecutor, although she - - she says that my husband is being prosecuted by your office, she says that - - that's not going to make a difference. I feel he's being fairly treated. She has no problem with that. What - - what could be the strategy to leave on this juror?

MR. SINGH: Sure, Your Honor. I think there can be a number of things. But first of all, without a 440, we're forced to speculate. But as far as what could be a reason? One could be the - - - that her husband was being prosecuted. Although she makes a statement that that would not affect her decision, I mean, the defense attorney doesn't have to believe that.



1 Next, it could be anything from as simple as the 2 defendant wanted her on the panel. It could be that 3 defense attorney felt she would be sympathetic to their 4 case. 5 The problem is, there could be - - - there could 6 be a whole number of reasons why defense attorney chose to 7 have - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: I quess I'm saying what - - -9 where was that, that she would be sympathetic to her case 10 when she's saying these memories are coming back; I feel uncomfortable about this; I was a victim twice. 11 12 MR. SINGH: Well - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: What - - - what could be the 14 speculation on this juror's going to be favorable, if you 15 will, to the defendant? 16 17

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MR. SINGH: Well, she - - - defense attorney might have thought she could be sympathetic for a number of reasons. Again, she seemed like she was not eager to serve on this jury. That could be one reason. The fact that she did mention that the - - - it was only on the third time when she spoke to the court she mentioned that she was the victim of sexual assault. She mentioned that her husband raped her. But that - - - that was on the third - - - third time that she spoke to the parties here.

Again, Your Honor, the problem here is, without a



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JUDGE FEINMAN: Could - - - could it also be a strategy that I don't necessarily need her to vote to acquit, I just need her to cause chaos in the jury room and get me a mistrial?

MR. SINGH: Absolutely.

JUDGE FEINMAN: Could that be a strategy?

MR. SINGH: Absolutely, Your Honor. And again -

- -

When you have to search for - - - for reasons to justify errors, because that's - - - when the People are put in that position - - - not you - - - but the People are put in that position where there's - - - there - - - what appears to be an error. They have to search to justify it to create those errors. So if they - - - if it's the case that you have to search, are, are you in essence arguing to us that it can never be - - - whenever there's multiple errors, there always has to be a 440 on ineffective assistance of counsel? You can never have this court find that there was ineffective assistance of counsel unless it's a Turner/dispositive error; are you arguing that?

MR. SINGH: What I'm arguing, Your Honor, is there needs to be something much more than what we have here. I - - I don't - -



1	JUDGE FAHEY: So it's a quan it's a quantu			
2	argument, and you're the quality argument, is what you're			
3	saying?			
4	MR. SINGH: Yes, in a sense.			
5	JUDGE FAHEY: All right.			
6	MR. SINGH: I			
7	JUDGE FAHEY: All right. So what about the			
8	question of why the Court conducted no further inquiry?			
9	Isn't that a dispositive question? There clearly seems to			
10	be something wrong. The court conducted no inquiry at all.			
11	MR. SINGH: Well, the the court the			
12	defense attorney raised			
13	JUDGE FAHEY: Did the court have an obligation to			
14	do that?			
15	MR. SINGH: I I don't believe in I			
16	don't think anything on anything that the juror said on its			
17	face would would lend the court to worry that she			
18	could not be impartial.			
19	Now, defense attorney brought up the fact that			
20	she mentioned her financial issues, her job issue. And in			
21	that regard, the court said that that's not something that			
22	needs to be discussed in private.			
23	JUDGE FAHEY: No, I was thinking more the rapes.			
24	But okay, go ahead.			
25	MR. SINGH: Well, I I know my adversary			

1 mentioned the fact that the parties - - - she said they 2 seem to have ignored the fact that this juror mentioned 3 that she was the victim of a sex crime. I - - - I don't 4 think that's fair to conclude from this record. I don't 5 think the - - - the two attorneys and the court heard this 6 and then simply forgot about it. I think - - - I think the 7 only - - - the only - - - the only conclusion - - - the 8 reasonable conclusion to draw from this was that defense 9 attorney was making a calculated decision that he wanted 10 this juror on the panel. 11 The - - - the problem here, Your Honor, is that 12 without a 440, not only does this - - -13 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, the problem with the 440 is 14 it doesn't get to the judge's error, it only gets to the 15

turn - - - attorney's strategy. You see what I'm saying? MR. SINGH: I understand.

> JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.

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MR. SINGH: I understand. But I don't think - -- sorry.

JUDGE FEINMAN: Please finish your answer to Judge Fahey, and then I have a different question for you. JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead.

MR. SINGH: I was going to say that there's - - there's nothing on the face of what the juror said here that would lend - - - that would - - - that would make it



so that the judge here felt that she could not be impartial. JUDGE FAHEY: I see. MR. SINGH: She - - - her - - - the only statement she made where she said she couldn't serve was because of her financial situation. She never said - - -JUDGE RIVERA: But that kind of begs the question, because she does say to defense counsel, yes, I'd rather talk to the judge in private, and that conversation never happens. MR. SINGH: Your Honor, when - - - when the the court responded by saying that I don't believe the

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defense attorney mentioned that, the - - - the court - - the court responded by saying that I don't believe the
financial issue warrants a private discussion. At that
point it was - - - it was - - - if anything further, it
should have been defense attorney that - - - that brought
up a further issue. But it - - - it seems likely that
defense attorney there had already made up his mind that he
wanted her on the panel.

And the - - - and the issue is that not only is it unfair to the defense attorney without a 440, it's also - - - it makes it difficult for this court, because we have only a partial record here.

JUDGE FEINMAN: So - - - so my question goes to the People's reply brief - - - not the People - - - the



1	defense reply brief focuses on King and sort of is a juror			
2	centric approach as opposed to, you know, what the impact			
3	on the defendant is. And I'm curious what your reply to			
4	the reply brief is.			
5	MR. SINGH: I'm sorry, as can you I'			
6	sorry, can you repeat that?			
7	JUDGE FEINMAN: They talk about the King case -			
8	_			
9	MR. SINGH: Yes.			
10	JUDGE FEINMAN: in their reply brief. And			
11	what do you have to say as as to that?			
12	MR. SINGH: I don't I don't think there -			
13	_			
14	JUDGE FEINMAN: It focuses on the impact on the			
15	juror.			
16	MR. SINGH: Sure. I don't I think I			
17	think that sort of $ -$ that's misplacing the issue here.			
18	The issue here is whether the court has enough on this			
19	partial record to overturn a jury verdict without hearing			
20	from the defense attorney. And I think that's patently			
21	unfair to the defense attorney. It's unfair to everyone			
22	involved in the first trial. It's unfair to the People.			
23	And			
24	JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, just I'm sorry to			
25	interrupt you, but if going back to something Judge			

Fahey was getting at. Let's say this was a 440 and the defense counsel comes in and says, look, I like - - - I liked this juror. I thought this was a great juror for me. I thought - - - because of what Judge Feinman said, I thought maybe they'll cause havoc in there, and that's a strategy. But the judge maybe had an independent duty to inquire of this juror.

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Would it be ineffective assistance of counsel for the defense counsel not to say wait, Judge, you have an independent duty to inquire and maybe toss this juror who I really like? I don't understand how the judge's conduct would come into play in this type of ineffective assistance claim. Again, talking about the juror.

MR. SINGH: I - - - I don't think it comes in - - - comes into play. I think it would - - - if anything, it would have been defense attorney who leads the discussion here if - - - if he, in fact, was worried about this juror.

And the fact - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, didn't the juror here ask to speak to the judge?

MR. SINGH: It - - defense attorney asked the juror after she mentioned the rape, he said would you like to speak to the judge in private.

JUDGE FAHEY: I see.

MR. SINGH: But he doesn't specify about what.



1	JUDGE FAHEY: Okay.	
2	MR. SINGH: And and	
3	JUDGE FAHEY: No, that's fine. That's fine.	
4	MR. SINGH: And and Your Honor, defense	
5	here has not	
6	JUDGE RIVERA: On a 440, is he going to get an	
7	automatic hearing, given the policy of trial counsel?	
8	MR. SINGH: I believe I believe there's a	
9	there's a good chance here that there there woul	
LO	be a hearing. I think I think it's beneficial to al	
L1	sides	
L2	JUDGE FEINMAN: The People could consent to have	
L3	the hearing.	
L4	MR. SINGH: I I can't consent to a future	
L5	440.	
L6	JUDGE FEINMAN: I'm not asking you to consent	
L7	right now. So so if if if you were to	
L8	succeed on this appeal, though, a 440 would still be	
L9	available?	
20	MR. SINGH: Yes, absolutely. I think a 440	
21	a future 440 motion is not barred by, you know, this	
22	court's affirming	
23	JUDGE FEINMAN: Um-hum. Okay.	
24	MR. SINGH: the Appellate Division here.	
25	And I think a 440	



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2	clear in your favor, can you still make the 440 argument?			
3	We said we agree with her that the record is clear, but no			
4	in her favor.			
5	MR. SINGH: I $ -$ I think they could $ -$ the			
6	could potentially still make a 440 claim that the th			
7	attorney was ineffective in this matter.			
8	Just briefly, Your Honor, for the confrontation			
9	clause argument, I think that suffers from the same flaw			
10	that is present here. We simply don't know what strategy			
11	defense attorney was employing when he chose not to object			
12	to the statement by Betsy. And the confrontation clause			
13	argument only applies to Betsy, because Angela was presen			
14	at the trial and she testified.			
15	JUDGE FEINMAN: Subject to recall and all of			
16	that.			
17	MR. SINGH: Yes, absolutely.			
18	JUDGE FEINMAN: But but what what			
19	possible explanation could he have for not seeking to at			
20	least having the letter redacted, as to some of the more			
21	damaging aspects of it?			
22	MR. SINGH: Well, I think I think			
23	this was a very strong case, Your Honor, with multiple			
24	witnesses. ID was not an issue at all.			
25	JUDGE FEINMAN: It's not a whodunit, it's			

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, if we said the record is

MR. SINGH: The letter - - -

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JUDGE FEINMAN: - - - a what's happened. You know, I understand that. So to the extent that you have things in this letter as to what happened that are harmful to the defendant, why isn't the defense lawyer either seeking to have that redacted or - - you know, think twice about opening the door the way that he did?

MR. SINGH: Well - - - well, I'm sure the People would have objected to a redacted letter being entered into evidence here. But clear - - I believe that the trial strategy here for defense attorney - - again, he was in a difficult situation. But the trial strategy was to try to impeach Devon and Angela through use of the letter. He spoke about that on summation.

And the fact that this case resulted in a conviction does not make the representation ineffective.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

Ms. Everett?

MS. EVERETT: Just briefly on the 440 issue. If the court were to say that the record was clear against us, then CPL 440 says you can't bring a 440 if you could have raised the issue on direct appeal.

But the People said to the court that there was nothing to worry that she could not be impartial. Well, I think that the record shows clearly that there was great



concern whether or not she could be impartial. She herself identified the fact that she had been the victim twice of the rape, and she said I want to - - in response to the defense lawyer's question, I want to speak to the judge in private.

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JUDGE FEINMAN: But - - - but if we accept that there's a possible strategy, then the question becomes - - - and this is the point, I think, of your reply brief - - - that never mind what the defense strategy was, the judge owed a duty to this juror. You know, it's a more juror-centric analysis. And - - - and have we gone that far?

MS. EVERETT: Well, the - - - you do have an obligation to make sure the defendant got a "fair trial". And if the defense lawyer doesn't bring to the judge's attention when it's obvious the judge has forgotten that she said she wanted to speak to the judge privately, and she used the phrase - - or answered the judge - - - the defense lawyer's question: "in this matter". So at that point of the colloquy, it's clear that what she wants to talk about is her experience as a victim of sexual violence, not about the financial concerns that the court remembered.

So when - - - when she's made this clear, how could you have a fair trial if the defense lawyer doesn't bring this to the judge's attention that she specifically



asked to speak to him on this?

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And I cited some commentators in the reply brief talking in general about the dangers when privacy interests of jurors aren't dealt with sensitively. They're not going to come forward and talk about things that make them biased. And you see this in this case that she says, you know, I want to speak to the judge in private, and there's no further inquiry.

And this is not a case where it's speculation that she - - - there's a risk that she wouldn't be partial, because she's - - herself has identified her experience. There are cases that I cite in my main brief that say that when the concern arises from the juror herself or himself that this is a - - - they see that it's a problem.

That's even more of a need for the judge to make inquiry in those situations. So for all the reasons, I think that this record is clear - - - yes?

DUDGE FEINMAN: Are those issue about - - because you're trying to do that by saying it's
ineffective. But is the issue about the judge's failure to
carry out his responsibility or her responsibility to make
sure there's a fair jury seated and to give voice to the
jurors' concerns, is that preserved? I mean, is that - - that - - I don't think that argument was made until you
got to your reply brief.

MS. EVERETT: Well, I think that - - - to the extent that I'm arguing that the defense lawyer has an obligation to protect Mr. Campbell's right to a fair trial, and when he fails to alert the judge that this woman said that she - - - it would be difficult for her to serve and she had a history of violence on a rape trial, that that's ineffective for the lawyer not to make sure that that inquiry is made to protect the fair trial rights of the defendant. Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. (Court is adjourned)



1	CERTIFICATION			
2				
3	I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing			
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5	People of the State of New York v. Ross Campbell, No. 100			
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